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This study compares average earnings and productivities for men and women employed in 
roughly 200,000 Chinese industrial enterprises. Women‟s average wages lag behind men‟s 
wages by 11%, and this result is robust to the inclusion of non-wage income in the form of 
social insurance payments. The gender-wage gap is wider among workers with more than 12 
years of education (28%), mainly because of the higher relative wages received by skilled 
men in foreign-invested firms. Women‟s average productivity falls behind men‟s productivity 
by a larger margin than the gap in earnings, and the null-hypothesis of earnings discrimination 
is thereby rejected. Equal average wages between men and women are found among firms 
located in China‟s Special Economic Zones, and also among some light industrial sectors with 
high shares of female employees. Market reform hence appears to have improved women‟s 
relative incomes. 
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Investigating  gender-earnings  discrimination  in  China  is  an  urgent  issue.  Not  only  is  the 
question  of  great  economic  and  social  importance  to  the  female  half  of  the  labor  force, 
reaching  640  million  in  2004.  It  is  also  of  wider  economic  importance  as  discrimination 
discourages  worker-groups  from  participating  in  employment  and  investing  in  skill 
development and education. As a consequence, human capital becomes underdeveloped and 
underutilized,  and  long-term  growth  is  negatively  affected.  Before  1978,  the  Chinese 
industrial  employee  was  assigned  to  a  state-owned  workplace  where  he  or  she  received 
welfare and wages according to a pre-determined and egalitarian grading system. After thirty 
years of market reform, today‟s industrial workers can be hired and fired by firms under 
various forms of ownership. Once employed, they now receive work compensation that is 
largely  determined  by  the  firm.  Researchers  have  argued  that  this  dramatic  increase  in 
employer  discretion  when  determining  the  employee‟s  work  compensation  has  led  to  a 
polarization of economic power across gender lines (Ngo, 2002; Razavi, 2007; Wang, 2006).  
In this paper I assess the gender-wage gap in the Chinese industrial sector using firm-
level data. The purpose is to examine how women fare compared to men in firms under 
various  forms  of  ownership,  and  if  the  gender  wage-gap  differs  between  low-  and  high-
educated employees. By testing if women‟s average wages correspond to their productivity 
contributions,  I  then  test  if  women  are  subject  to  wage-discrimination.  In  an  extended 
analysis,  the  effect  of  non-wage  compensation  on  the  gender-polarization  of  earnings  is 
investigated by adding firm contributions to social insurances to the wage-measure.  
The paper addresses a number of limitations in the existing literature, the first of 
which concerns the standard methodology. A vast majority of previous empirical studies of 
gender-wage discrimination in China uses individual- or household-level, where a residual   3 
gap in wages is interpreted as discrimination (see Shen and Deng, 2008 for a survey). As 
pointed out by e.g. Altonji and Blank (1999), the observable individual-level characteristics in 
the  wage-equation  are  however  unlikely  to  capture  all  gender-related  differences  in 
productivity. Relying on this method therefore implies a risk of overestimating the degree of 
discrimination
2. By instead employing the method proposed by Hellerstein and Neumark 
(1999), this paper uses firm-level data to retrieve direct measures of the productivities of men 
and women from the production function. Discrimination can then be assessed by comparing 
the parameter capturing women‟s relative productivity with their relative wages.   
A second contribution stems from the quality of the data used. In this respect, the 
paper  provides  substantial  improvements  on  Dong  and  Zhang‟s  (2009)  unique  firm-level 
study of gender-wage discrimination in China, a study that uses a methodology similar to the 
one in this paper. Compared to their study, data coverage is expanded from a fraction of the 
economy – 856 firms located in a few large cities – to a sample of 199,840 firms, including all 
large and medium-sized industrial enterprises as well as the majority of those designated as 
“small”.  This  reduces  the  risk  of  sample  bias
3 and  strengthens  the  statistical  precision. 
Moreover, the availability of gender-disaggregated information on the education levels  of 
firm  employees  allows  the  computation  of  skill-weighted  wage-  and  productivity  gaps 
between men and women.    
This  is  the  first  study  that  examines  the  role  of  non-wage  compensation  to  the 
gender-polarization  of  total  earnings  in  Chinese  industry.  Providing  employees  with 
mainstream social insurances has been shown to carry a cost that amounts to over 50% of the 
total wage compensation paid by firms (Banister, 2005)
4, and revious research has argued that 
                                                 
2 The part of the wage-gap not explained by proxies for individual productivity is indeed large in previous studies, for 
example 53-63% found by Gustafsson and Li (2000), 89-92% by Liu et al (2000) and 85% by Wang and Cai (2008).  
3 this is particularly important in a vast economy such like the Chinese where development levels, market reform intensity 
and social norms vary greatly across geographical regions. 
4 Banister (2005) draws upon a survey conducted by China‟s Ministry of Labor, and covering 11,704 urban enterprises in 51 
large cities, to conclude that the standard wage measure of employee earnings should be increased by 53.8 percent to fully 
account for labor compensation actually paid by urban employers.   4 
insurance coverage has become increasingly gender-biased in the transition period (Razavi, 
2007; Wang, 2006).  
The results show an average skill-weighted wage-gap of 11% in the nation-wide 
sample, and a somewhat wider gap (28%) among men and women with above-high school 
education.  Highly  skilled  men  have  benefitted  more  from  the  internationalization  of  the 
industrial  sector.  Their  wage-advantages  over  skilled  women  are  larger  in  firms  with 
investments from abroad or from Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Macao. Another finding is that 
industrial sector matters greatly for the average male-female wage-gap. Zero wage-differences 
are found in sectors with large shares of female employees such as the Tailoring, Leather, and 
Textile sectors. Equal wages between women and men are also found among firms located in 
China‟s  Special  Economic  Zones.  Market  reform  and  the  increasing  importance  of  light 
industry hence appear to have improved the relative incomes of female industrial employees. 
Women‟s productivity lags behind men‟s productivity by a larger margin (41%) than 
their  wages  lag  behind  men‟s  wages  (11%).  Although  the  null-hypothesis  of  wage-
discrimination  is  thereby  rejected,  women‟s  productivity  disadvantage  may  reflect  other 
forms of discriminatory treatment on the labor market (Bergmann, 1974)
5. Some sectors have 
however been more successful in harnessing female productivity, especially foreign-invested 
enterprises and firms in light industrial sectors.  
Non-wage compensation measured by firm contributions to social insurances is not 
found  to  increase  men‟s  earnings  advantage.  If  anything,  their  distribution  favors  skilled 
workers in general and skilled women in particular, yielding a slightly narrower gender-wage 
gap among skilled workers than when only wages are considered.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of reforms to 
wage-setting and welfare systems in the post-1978 period and presents previous research on 
                                                 
5 Systematically lower productivities among women could result from gender-differences in firm‟s hiring practices and in 
occupational mobility, which in turn affect men‟s and women‟s efforts on their jobs.   5 
gender-wage discrimination in China. Section 3 explains the basic econometric framework 
and  section  4  discusses  the  dataset  and  variable  computations.  Estimation  results  are 
presented in section 5 and section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Wage and non-wage compensation in Chinese industry  
 
In  pre-reform  socialist  China,  urban  industrial  workers  enjoyed  a  system  of  guaranteed 
occupational and income security. This “Iron Rice Bowl” also provided access to welfare 
benefits (health care, pensions, education) which were distributed via state-owned work units. 
The “emancipation of women” constituted an ethical commitment of the socialist state, and 
entailed their juridical equality with men, entry into paid work, and access to social rights. 
Under  this  system,  women‟s  incomes  improved  radically.  The  gender  wage  differential 
narrowed and became small in an international comparison, particularly in urban areas (Croll, 
1995). With an industrial policy that emphasized heavy and capital-intensive industry, many 
women came to fill positions for which they were biologically disadvantaged compared to 
men, such as blue collar jobs requiring physical strength. The resulting skill mismatch was 
however  not  reflected  in  the  centrally  determined  and  egalitarian  remuneration  system 
(Korzec, 1992).  
In the late 1970s, a series of radical reforms were enacted on the industrial labor 
market. Transformation of the wage-setting system started in the early 1980s when firms were 
given  autonomy  over  their  remuneration  systems  within  government  guidelines.  By  the 
1990s, those guidelines had evolved into abiding by minimum wages (Shen, 2007). Another 
centerpiece of reform was the transfer of the labor allocation decision from the state and to the 
enterprises. By 1994, firms had been given the right to dismiss workers. This new authority 
was extensively practiced during a massive retrenchment program in the state-owned sector. 
Between 1997 and 2002, more than 28 million state employees were asked to leave their jobs   6 
(Dong and Xu, 2005)
6.  
Reform  aimed  at  streamlining  SOE  organizations  cam e  as  a  response  to  the 
increasing competition from the private sector, which was growing rapidly. This private 
sector, composed by both domestic and foreign -invested actors, also represented a problem 
from a social insurance perspective. A growing number of employees working in the private 
firms did not have access to the enterprise-provided benefits granted by the State-owned work 
units. In fact, as market -reform progressed, even state employees were increasingly facing 
social insecurity.  Many SOEs were h aving difficulties meeting their welfare obligations, 
partly because of the rising compet ition  from the private sector, and partly because of a 
massive welfare burden stemming from a system setup where each SOE retained substantial 
financial responsibilities for its laid -off and retired workers. To free the SOEs from this 
welfare burden and to provide social security for private sector workers became two main 
objectives for a social system overhaul in the 1990s.  
Put simply, welfare reform consisted in breaking up the enterprise-based entitlement 
model, known as the Labor Insurance Scheme (LIS), into separate social insurances. Instead 
of the self-insurance of each firm under the LIS, the new programs aimed to share risk across 
firms by pooling worker accounts on the provincial- and, in some cases, the city-level. State-
owned firms were encouraged to switch from the LIS to the separate insurances, and private 
firms were mandated to join.  In this way, the 90s saw the birth of a two-tiered pension system 
in 1997 and the Urban Employee‟s Basic Health Care Insurance System in 1998. In 1999, 
China instituted an unemployment insurance system with properties similar to those found in 
industrialized countries
7. Concerning the provision of housing, the direct allocati on by work 
                                                 
6 Women were over-represented among the laid-off SOE employees (Appleton et al., 2002; Giles et al., 2006) but 
simultaneously increased in demand in the export-oriented, and highly labor intensive, industries.  
7 Under this program, an individual is eligible for benefits if he or she i) has contributed to the Unemployment Insurance for 
at least one year, ii) has been involuntarily laid-off, and iii) is registered as unemployed and willing to work. The most recent 
alteration in to the Unemployment Insurance system is the binggui policy under which previously laid-off SOE workers are 
detached from their old workplaces, where they had remained despite being formally out of work and merged with the pooled 
insurance system.    7 
units visa the LIS was replaced by a savings system where accumulated funds can be used for 
housing  purchase  or  repairs
8. As with the LIS, these new insurances applied to urban 
industrial firms, while rural industry was excluded , although with  the ambition of a later 
extension of coverage. Rural areas are also excluded from f ormal medical insurance, and 
retirement protection is scarce (Banister, 2005; Jackson et al., 2009). 
The new insurance programs had to make up for a legacy of unmet obligations in the 
SOE sector. Although subject to some discretion at the administrative level (provincial and 
sometimes sub-provincial), contribution levels were therefore set at a generally high level. 
Guidelines call for a total of 24% of payroll directed toward pensions accounts (Jackson et al, 
2009), 16% toward the housing accumulation funds (by year 2003, Wang et al., 2005), 
between 2-6% toward medical insurance (Xu et al, 2007), and 2% toward the unemployment 
insurance (Vodopivec and Tong, 2008).   
Similar to the ambition for mobile accounts in the new insurance systems, the 
ambition of complete coverage of the urban industrial sector remains largely unmet. Although 
participation in the programs is mandatory for firms, lack of enforcement has effectiv ely 
given them the option of non-compliance. In 2005, the pension scheme covered 17% of the 
workforce,  and  the  unemployment  insurance  covered  14%  (NBS,  National  Bure au  of 
Statistics of  China, 2006 ,  pp.  43  and  201).  Overall  health  insurance   coverage  actually 
decreased between 1998 and 2003, as mainstream coverage fell more sharply than the 
increase in commercial and other non -commercial insurances (Xu et al., 2007). Qualitative 
research has indicated an emerging pattern of gender-polarization in insurance coverage in the 
export-oriented  sectors  of  the  economy  (Razavi,  2007),  and  that  in  particular  women 
dismissed  from  SOEs  have  been  pushed  into  ownership  sectors  where  social  security 
protection is low (Cooke, 2001; Stockman, 1994).  It has also been pointed ou t that the 
                                                 
8 In addition to participating in these housing accumulation funds, firms may also provide their employees with loosely 
regulated subsidies. These may cover a range of residential services, rent payments as well as cash hand outs to purchase 
state-owned housing which was previously allocated by the work units (Wang et al., 2005).   8 
principle of proportionally tying contributions to the employee‟s wage may compound the 
wage-differential  between  men  and  women  (Razavi,  2007;  Wang,  2006).  These  claims 
however remain without quantitative verification.  
Contrary to the case of non-wage compensation, a considerably large literature has 
investigated the wage-aspect of earnings discrimination in the reform period. Most previous 
studies use individual-level data from the China Household Income Project, carried out by the 
Chinese Academy of social sciences in 1988 and 1995. They find that the gender wage gap is 
slightly below 20%, and fairly constant over this period (Gustafsson and Li, 2000, Bishop et 
al. 2005, Démurger et al., 2007, Shu and Bian, 2003). This result is corroborated by earlier 
findings from a Tianjin sample collected in 1993 (Bian et al., 2000), as well as the findings of 
researchers using data from the Urban Household Survey between 1988 and 1999 (Ng, 2004; 
Liu et al, 2004). Xu et al. (2006) find a slightly larger gap, 32%, in two recently urbanized 
towns in Zhejiang Province between 1999 and 2000. This is similar to Dong and Zhang‟s 
(2009) finding when using firm-level data from the late 1990s. Regarding the size of the 
wage-gap across educational categories, a number of studies find that the gap is narrower 
among  highly  educated  employees  (Xu  et  al.,  2006;  Hughes  and  Maurer-Fazio,  2002; 
Gustafsson and Li, 2000). 
The  share  of  the  gender-wage  gap  that  is  not  explained  by  gender-related 
productivity proxies in the wage equation is generally large in previous studies. Over 50% of 
the wage gap is found to be unexplained by some studies (Bishop et al. 2005, Shu and Bian, 
2003, Gustafsson and Li, 2000), and over 75% by many others (Liu et al. 2000; Rozelle et al. 
2002; Wang and Cai, 2008). On the contrary, Dong and Zhang‟s (2009) study does not find 
evidence of discrimination. Women‟s estimated wages are not statistically different from their 
estimated productivity.  
In a transition economy, the wage-setting practices of employers may differ widely   9 
between the large ownership fractions on the labor market. Xu et al. (2006) record the largest 
wage gap in privately owned enterprises, while Maurer-Fazio and Hughes (2002) and Maurer-
Fazio et al. (1999) find the largest gaps in firms registered as joint ventures. Liu et al. (2000), 
and Hughes and Maurer-Fazio (2002), also find the widest wage-gaps in the most marketized 
ownership sectors. Their results however also show that these sectors have the largest shares 
of their wage-gaps remaining unexplained by observed worker characteristics. Rozelle et al. 
(2003) do not find any systematic association between the level of wage discrimination and 
the degree of market orientation by industry or ownership. Finally, the firm-level study of 856 
firms conducted by Dong and Zhang (2009) yields the result that women are rewarded in 
accordance with their productivity in private firms, but that women are over-compensated in 
the state-owned sector. 
3. Empirical methodology 
We begin by expressing firm value added as a Cobb Douglas production function with the 
inputs capital (K) and labor (L)
 9. The labor input is interpreted as a quality of labor index  
 
S FS S MS U FU U F M F M QL                (1) 
 
where  j F and  j M are the number of female or male employees who are skilled,  S j  , or 
unskilled,  U j  . In logs, our production function can be written   
 
  S FS S MS U FU U L C F M F M K A VA            ln ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( .  (2) 
                                                 
9 As discussed by Griliches and Ringstad (1971), the value added specification of the production function improves 
comparability of data across industries and across establishments within industries. It also allows greater comparability when 
industries or establishments differ in the degree of vertical integration, and can be derived from quite polar production 
function specifications: one in which the elasticity of substitution between materials and value added is infinite (i.e., 
Y=f(K,QL)+M); and one in which this elasticity of substitution is zero (so that materials have to be used in a fixed proportion 
to output).   10 
 
The specification of the quality of labor index implies that members of the four gender-skill 
groups are assumed to be perfectly substitutable inputs, but that the marginal productivities of 
the groups are allowed to differ. The parameters  ij  denote the average marginal productivity 
of employees with male or female gender  ) , ( F M i   that are considered to be either skilled 
or unskilled  ) , ( U S j   as compared to male unskilled workers. In this setting, the empirical 
observation  that  1    FS MS FU    would  indicate  that  all  four  gender-skill  groups 
contribute equally to firm output. Alternatively, the interpretation of a finding that  5 . 0  FU   
would be that the average marginal productivity of female unskilled employees is 50% lower 
than the average productivity of their male unskilled co-workers. Letting L represent total 
firm employment so that  S S U U F M F L M     we can rewrite (2) as  
 
        S FS S MS U FU L C F M F L K A VA 1 1 1 ln ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(               .     (3) 
 
We next turn to the estimation of relative differentials in work compensation. A firm-level 
wage equation is set up as a Mincer-type earnings equation  
 
        F M F L QL W FS S MS U FU T 1 1 1 ln ) ln( ) ln( 0 0                        (4) 
 
where  the  dependent  variable  is  the  total  wage  bill,  or  the  total  amount  of  worker 
compensation, paid by the firm
10. Analogous to the production function specification, the 
                                                 
10 To see how this firm-level function can be understood as an aggregation of individual-level wage equations over workers in 
the firm, consider the individual level wage equation  i F i M i F w M w w    where  i w  is the wage of an individual worker 
with gender i,  M w and  F w are average wages, and  i M and  i F are dummy variables for females and males respectively. 
Aggregating this function over the firm we get that the total wage bill is  F w F L w W F M    ) ( , which can be expressed 




w . Taking logs gives   11 
parameters  ij   denote the relative average wages of the three gender-skill groups compared to 
the wages of unskilled male workers.  
By  comparing the estimated results  of the production function (3), and the wage 
equation (4) we can now specify a test of whether or not gender-skill groups of employees are 
paid in accordance with their contribution to firm output. This test amounts to comparing the 
relative wage parameters  ij   with the relative productivity parameters  ij   for each group. If 
the  estimated  marginal  work  compensation  falls  short  of  the  marginal  productivity  so 
that ij ij    , this is interpreted as under-compensation of that specific gender-skill group. To 
produce  the  parameters  necessary  to  test  whether  women,  as  an  aggregated  group,  are 
discriminated against, we compute skill-weighted productivity and earnings differentials as 
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         (5) 
 
where  ij P  is the proportion of employees with gender i and skill level j in their respective 
gender group
11, where  ij   is replaced by  ij   to produce the earnings differential.  
A major limitation of using firm-level data is the inability of distinguishing whether 
estimated differences in wages and productivities between worker groups stem from within or 
across-firm  variation.  The  interpretation  of  a  negative  gap  between  average  wage  and 
productivity of a socioeconomic group ( 0   ij ij   ), as discrimination, hence hinges on the 
assumption  that  this  group  has  not  been  systematically  hired  by  lower  paying  or  less 
productive  firms.  Regarding  unobservables,  their  effect  on  the  test  of  equal  relative 
productivities and earnings should be limited if the direction of the bias is the same for both 
                                                                                                                                                          
the simplified equivalent of equation (4), in which the constant corresponds to the average wage of men
M w ln 0   . 
11 so that  1   FS FU P P , and  1   MS MU P P .
 
   12 
variables.  Robustness  checks  carried  out  below  aim  to  assess  potential  bias  in  the  point 
estimates  stemming  from,  among  other  thing,  gender-differences  in  the  number  of  hours 
worked,  selection  of  women  into  labor-intensive  industries,  and  the  degree  of  market 
exposure facing the firm.  
Estimation of equations (3) and (4) is done simultaneously using the Non-Linear 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (NLSUR) method which takes account of cross-equation 
correlation in the shocks to wages and output. A vector of controls is added to each of the 
estimated production and wage equations. The measures of work compensation and output of 
firms  are  thereby  allowed  to  vary  systematically  with  the  firms‟  age,  size,  geographical 
location and industrial sector
12.  
 
4. Data, variables and summary statistics 
 
This  study  uses  survey  data  on  industrial  firms  collected  by  China's  National  Bureau  of 
Statistics (NBS) in 2005
13. The dataset covers all state-owned firms and all non-state firms 
with annual sales above 5 million RMB (about 750,000 US dollar) and includes all firms 
formally designated as large or medium size, as well as the bulk of those designated as 
"small-scale." Dividing the total value added in the dataset by the industrial GDP reported in 
China‟s Statistical Yearbook indicates that the dataset accounts for 94% of total industrial 
output.  
The dataset contains information on sales, capital stock, the total number of workers 
and  the  share  of  women,  the  total  wage  bill,  and  also  annual  firm  expenditures  on  four 
categories of social insurance items: (1) housing accumulation funds and housing subsidies, 
                                                 
12 Adding these controls corresponds to assuming that firms are price takers in labor market specific to these characteristics 
(i.e. geographical location, industry etc). Moreover, as long as segmentation of markets along these dimensions leads to 
proportional variation in wages across gender, then the equations can be augmented by adding these variables linearly.   
13 This dataset is used by the NBS to compile the "industry" section of the China Statistical Yearbook and industry specific 
reports in the China Markets Yearbook.    13 
(2) pensions and medical insurance, and (3) labor insurance and unemployment insurance. In 
order to attain a more accurate measure of labor quality, the 2005 dataset is complemented 
with information on the gender-disaggregated human capital distribution of firms from the 
expanded  census  data  from  2004.  A  worker  is  considered  to  be  skilled  if  he  or  she  has 
completed junior college or more, and unskilled otherwise. Merging data for these two years 
requires the assumption that the share of skilled persons within the female and male employee 
groups has not changed between the years. It also necessitates the removal of 61,384 firms 
which  are  not  in  operation  in  both  years.  The  final  sample  size  after  following  the  data 
cleaning procedure of Jefferson et al. (2008) is 199,840
14.  
Variables are created as follows. The dependent variable of the production function 
is value added, which is calculated by subtracting material costs from total sales. The capital 
measure is the net value of fixed assets. Wages is the total wage bill, which includes social 
insurance payments deducted from employee earnings, but not the payments made by the 
employer (Table A1  lists the  components of the wage variable). A more comprehensive  
measure  of  total  work  compensation  is  created  by  adding  the  sum  of  the  employer‟s 
expenditures on social insurance payments to the wage bill. R&D intensity is the logarithm of 
the firm‟s expenditure on research and development, and a unionization dummy takes the 
value one if the firm the firm has a trade union in the year 2004, and zero otherwise.  
Ownership categories are created by aggregating 23 ownership registration types into 
five broader categories, closely tracking the formal classification system currently used for 
reporting data on all industrial firms in China‟s Statistical Yearbook. Enterprises are defined 
as State-owned (SOE), Collective owned (COE)
15, Private (PRI), funded by entities in Hong 
                                                 
14 Enterprises with less than eight employees, and those that are in the upper and lower tails of productivity, are excluded to 
correct for improbable values. The latter is done in two steps. First, ratios of value added to labor and capital, and ratios of 
labor and capital to value added are computed. Then, those firms that lay more than four standard deviations above the mean 
of each of those four variables are deleted. Firms are also dropped if the ratio of value added to sales is either negative or 
larger than one, and if they report negative values of capital or labor. The procedure removes 17,868 firms, whereof the 
majority report zero employment.  
15 Collective-owned  firms are  economic entities that are registered in accordance with the  Regulation  of  the  People’s   14 
Kong, Macao or Taiwan (HKMT), Foreign-invested (FIE), and “Other” (see Table A2 for 
details). Also included in the empirical analysis are two measures of the asset  ownership 
composition of firms: the shares of paid-in capital supplied by the state and the combined 
shares  for  capital  from  entities  in  foreign  countries  or  from  HKMT.  Incorporating  these 
measures may  yield improved predictions of firm performance, in particular if ownership 
registration is an unreliable measure of actual firm control (Sabin, 1994; Jefferson and Su, 
2006). Additional control variables are industrial categories on the two-digit level, province, 
size,  age,  and  a  proxy  for  rural  location  taking  the  value  one  if  a  firm  is  under  the 
administrative  control  of  the  county,  small  town,  street,  village,  resident-  or  village 
committee. 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. They show that the average firm has 373 
employees,  among  which  women  make  up  42%.  Of  these  women,  10.6%  have  a  junior 
college degree or higher (>12 years of education). The corresponding percentage for men is 
15.5%, illustrating the gender division in human capital in the industrial sector as evidenced 
in the national census conducted in 2000
16. Examining the ownership-based sub-samples, the 
share of female employees is the lowest in the state-owned sector (29%), somewhat higher in 
firms that are private (43%) or collective owned (40%), and the highest in foreign- (52%) and 
HKMT-funded firms (54%).
17 The state-owned firms have a larger average size (803) than the 
other sectors, and we find the smallest average workforce s ize in the collective and private 
sectors, close to 150 workers. Average wages are the lowest in the state-owned and collective 
owned enterprises.  
                                                                                                                                                          
Republic of China on the Management of Registration of Legal Enterprises, where assets are owned collectively. They 
include urban and rural enterprises invested by collectives, and some enterprises registered with industrial and commercial 
administration agency as collective units, where funds are pulled together by individuals who voluntarily give up their right 
of ownership (China Statistical Yearbook 2006, chapter 13).  
16 In urban China, men had on average 0.93 more years of schooling than women.  
17 Previous studies suggest that the workforces of export-oriented and foreign-invested enterprises may be up to eighty 
percent female (Tan, 2000). In the dataset used in this paper this is true for 12% of the HKMT-funded firms, and for 14% of 
the foreign-funded firms.   15 
The ownership distribution of the dataset is such that 44.4% of the firms are domestic 
and privately owned, 7.9% are state-owned, 8.4% are collective owned, while 11.2% and 
11.6% are funded by entities based in Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan and in foreign countries 
respectively.  Finally,  16.4%  of  the  firms  fall  into  the  category  “Other”
18.  Examining  the 
average asset shares held by the Chinese state and by foreign and HKMT entities in the 
different ownership categories does not provide evidence for sizeable deviations between the 
registration-based ownership categorization and the asset holding structure of firms. Summary 
statistics of the geographical and industrial composition of the dataset are placed in Appendix, 
Tables A3 and A4.  
Table  2  displays  descriptive  statistics  of  the  three  non-wage  compensation 
expenditure  items.  The  top  half  of  the  table  shows  the  share  of  firms  reporting  positive 
expenditures on each variable, which is interpreted as participation in the program, and the 
bottom half details the cost of the insurance item as a share of the total wage cost in those 
participating firms. We first note that 16% of the firms report non-zero expenditures on all 
three non-salary items. Looking at the disaggregated figures, the highest participation rate is 
recorded for the Pensions and Medical care programs (66%), while a lowest is associated with 
the  Labor  and/or  Unemployment  insurances  (44%)  and  the  Housing  funds  and  subsidies 
programs (18%). There is substantial variation in participation rates across ownership sectors.  
Coverage is higher than average among state-owned firms and foreign-invested firm
19. 
Turning to the bottom half of Table 2, we see that payments amount to, on average, 
39% of the total wage cost in firms that rep ort non-zero expenditures on all three items. For 
the housing variable, and the combined expenditures on health and pension insurance, we 
may moreover note that expenditure levels as a share of wages is markedly below the 
payment guidelines set up by the central government. 
                                                 
18 See Table A2 for a list of the registration categories included under this definition.  
19 Because of the presence of rural firms with lower welfare obligations in the sample, the figures in Table 2 should not be 
interpreted as the precise share of urban firms that comply with social insurance requirements.   16 
 
 
5.  Are women discriminated against in Chinese industry? 
 
5.1 Baseline estimation results  
The first main results of this paper are found in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 present estimates 
from jointly estimating equations (3) and (4) for the full sample and using the total wage bill 
as  the  dependent  variable  in  the  wage  equation.  We  first  note  that  that  the  estimated 
coefficients on capital and labor in the production function are 0.62 and 0.22, both of which 
are highly significant and of plausible magnitudes. Row one of the table contains the skill-
weighted productivity and wage differentials between women and men. These parameters 
indicate that women earn 11% less than men ( = 0.89) and that they are 41% less productive 
( = 0.59). Comparing the sizes of the estimates to the results found by authors using similar 
empirical strategies for other economies, the narrow wage gap is particularly noteworthy. 
Hellerstein et al. (1999) report a 45% gender-wage difference for the US, Bartolucci (2008) 
finds a 34% gap in the case of Germany, and Asano and Kawaguchi (2007) a 70% gap in 
Japan. The comparatively narrow wage gap in China indicates that Maoist gender equality 
ideology  has  been  maintained  in  the  economic  transition.  Regarding  the  productivity   17 
Table 1   
Summary Statistics 
  All firms  SOE  COE  PRI  HKMT  FIE  Other 
No. of firms  















Log value added  8.96  9.08  8.72  8.65  9.24  9.59  9.20 
Log capital  8.40  9.43  7.95  7.93  8.69  8.99  8.79 
Log wages  7.33  7.84  7.04  6.93  7.88  7.98  7.51 
Log wages and benefits  7.44  8.08  7.14  7.01  7.97  8.10  7.64 
Employment  283  806  185  146  370  361  340 
Female employees (share)  0.42  0.29  0.40  0.43  0.54  0.52  0.38 
Share of male unskilled employees  0.49  0.55  0.56  0.52  0.41  0.40  0.51 
Share of male skilled employees  0.09  0.15  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.08  0.11 
Share of female unskilled employees  0.38  0.23  0.39  0.41  0.51  0.47  0.33 
Share of female skilled employees  0.05  0.07  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.05  0.05 
Log R&D expenditure  0.58  1.05  0.26  0.38  0.48  0.74  1.00 
Firm size (share)               
    8-50  0.22  0.20  0.26  0.28  0.11  0.15  0.17 
    51-100  0.25  0.17  0.27  0.30  0.19  0.20  0.23 
    101-500  0.43  0.40  0.41  0.39  0.53  0.50  0.46 
    501-1000  0.06  0.11  0.04  0.03  0.11  0.09  0.08 
    1001-  0.04  0.13  0.02  0.01  0.07  0.07  0.06 
Firm age (share)               
    < 3 years   0.26  0.10  0.12  0.31  0.24  0.27  0.27 
    4-7 years  0.26  0.15  0.25  0.23  0.28  0.31  0.24 
    8-12 years  0.24  0.68  0.56  0.13  0.25  0.15  0.22 
    > 12 years  0.24  0.39  0.68  0.04  0.11  0.13  0.36 
Rural administrative subordination   0.19  0.07  0.08  0.33  0.24  0.27  0.27 
FIE and HKMT asset share  0.18  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.77  0.74  0.01 
State asset share  0.07  0.81  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Unionization  0.47  0.85  0.53  0.37  0.14  0.44  0.57 
Notes: Value added, capital, wages, non-wage compensation, and R&D expenditures are in logs of thousands of Yuan.    18 
Table 2 













         
Share of participating firms (expenditure > 0)     
All firms   0.16  0.66  0.18  0.44 
   SOE  0.45  0.77  0.52  0.67 
   COE   0.11  0.60  0.13  0.36 
   PRI   0.06  0.56  0.34  0.32 
   HKMT   0.13  0.81  0.15  0.58 
   FIE    0.30  0.80  0.34  0.61 
   Other   0.21  0.67  0.24  0.50 
Ratio of insurance payments to total wage costs in participating firms 
All firms  0.39  0.14  0.11  0.06 
   SOE  0.44  0.24  0.11  0.09 
   COE  0.37  0.16  0.09  0.06 
   PRI  0.42  0.11  0.13  0.06 
   HKMT  0.28  0.09  0.08  0.03 
   FIE   0.29  0.13  0.08  0.03 
   Other  0.37  0.17  0.13  0.06 
 
difference, it is larger than those found for the non-Asian economies (16% for both the US 
and  Germany),  but  smaller  than  the  one  for  Japan  (66%).  Testing  the  hypothesis  of  no 
discrimination by comparing the size of the two gaps shows that women in Chinese industry 
on average receive wages that exceed their productivity contributions.We hence reject the 
null-hypothesis of wage-discrimination against female employees in the nation-wide sample.   
A productivity disadvantage of women is a common result in empirical studies that 
use firm-level data to estimate gender-differences in productivity from production functions. 
It should be noted that this disadvantage could in itself reflect gender-related discrimination in 
the  allocation  of  labor  within  and  between  firms  (i.e.  Bergmann,  1974).  A  systematic 
difference in productivity between men and women with similar education levels may reflect 
that women are systematically matched with jobs that do not fit their preferences, skills and 
abilities. Previous studies of the Chinese labor market have found discriminatory treatment of 
women in the hiring process (Cooke, 2001), and in upward mobility within and between firms 
(Cao and Hu, 2007; Song and Dong, 2009). Such gender-stereotyping and discrimination may   19 
in turn have affected Chinese women‟s motivations and efforts on their jobs (Korabik, 1994; 
Peng et al. 2009) and thereby led to further widening of the productivity gap.  
We now compare the relative marginal wages and productivities of men and women 
with similar skill levels. Row three in Table 3 shows estimation results for workers with less 
than 12 years of education. Because unskilled workers make up the majority of the workforce 
in the industrial sector, these coefficients are very similar those in row one: women are 45% 
less productive and earn 11% less. Results for workers with more than 12 years of education 
are shown in rows 3 and 4. For both women and men, their wages and productivities are 
substantially larger than for unskilled males, as indicated by the parameters exceeding one. 
Investing in education is rewarded by a 93% education premium for men ( = 1.93), and a 
65%  ( FS  =1.65)  premium  for  women.  Calculating  the  difference  between  these  two 
premiums  returns  a  28%  gender-wage  gap  among  skilled  workers  (1.93-1.63).
20  The 
divergence of this gender-wage gap from that found among unskilled workers (11%) is 
statistically different at the one percent level.  Contrary to the results from some previous 
studies using individual data (Millimet and Wang, 2006; Hughes and Maurer-Fazio, 2002; Xu 
et al., 2006; Gustafsson and Li, 2000), the empirical analysis in this paper therefore indicates 
that the gender-wage gap is narrower in the lower  part of the skill-distribution than in the 
upper part.  
Next, we test the null of matching productivities and wages  of skilled male and 
female workers. The results in rows seven and eight are both negative, suggesting that the 
wage premiums received by persons of both genders who invest in education fail to reflect the 
value  of  those  investments  to  firm  productivity.  This  result  echoes  previous  findings  
                                                 
20 Within the groups “skilled” and “unskilled”, men and women have roughly the same average number of years of schooling.     20 
regarding inefficiencies in the compensation of skilled employees in China‟s rural industry 




Table 3   
Joint production function and earnings equation estimates:  
Cobb-Douglas production function, all firms 
Wages and productivities relative to 



















































Wage-productivity gap for…         
   ...female workers  0.31     0.31   
   …female unskilled workers  0.34     0.34   
   …female skilled workers  -0.80     -0.60   
   …male skilled workers  -1.99     -1.87   
Log labor 
0.62  
(.01)    
0.63 
(.00)   
Log capital 
0.22  
(.00)    
0.21 
(.00)   


















R-squared  0.56  0.84  0.56  0.83 
Correlation between equations  0.13    0.13   
N  194,942    194,950   
Notes:  All  equations  include  a  constant  term  and  dummy  variables  for  geographical  location  (22 
provinces, 5 administrative regions and 4 municipalities, Beijing = reference), industry (38 categories, 
textile = reference), size (five categories, < 51 employees  =  reference), age (four categories, established 
earlier than 1994 = reference), unionization (1 if the firm has a union), ownership (six categories, private 
Chinese firms = reference), the share of state capital in total capital, and the share of foreign and HKMT 
capital in total capital. Bold letters indicate that the null-hypothesis of equal wages and productivities for 
workers of gender i and skill-group j,    or  , is rejected at the five percent 
level. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   
 
 
                                                 
21 The authors find that monopsony power and inadequate possibilities to exploit returns to scale among firms do not 
satisfactorily explain the failure of wages of skilled workers to reflect their productivity. Persistant deviations of wages from 
productivity, they argue, could be the result of segmentation of the labor market caused the hukou-system‟s restrictions on 
worker mobility.   21 
5.2 Does ownership matter? 
Many studies of gender-wage discrimination in China have confirmed the importance of firm 
ownership.  Table  4  presents  results  from  jointly  estimating  equations  (3)  and  (4)  for  six 
ownership sectors: 1) state-owned enterprises (SOE), 2) collective owned enterprises (COE), 
3) privately owned enterprises (PRI), 4) firms funded by entities based in Hong Kong, Macao 
or Taiwan (HKMT), 5)  foreign-invested firms  (FIE), and  6)  firms  with  mixed ownership 
(Other). We first focus on the gap in skill-weighted average wages between men and women, 
reported in row 1. We see that this gap is somewhat smaller in COEs (3%) and PRI (10%) 
firms than in FIEs (16%). The estimated gap among State-owned (12%) firms is however not 
statistically significant from any of the other ownership sectors. If we consider Collective 
firms as “state-controlled”, these results are somewhat in line with previous studies showing 
larger wage-gaps in foreign-invested sectors than in state-controlled ones (Maurer-Fazio et al. 
1999; Hughes and Maurer-Fazio, 2002; Liu et al., 2000; Xu et al., 2006).  
By examining the gender wage-gaps between workers with similar education levels 
we can gain further insights into the importance of ownership sector to the wage dynamics 
between women and men. Looking first at the reward pattern between women and men with 
less than 12 years of education, and who comprise on average 87% of the firms‟ workforces, 
we note that unskilled women earn less than unskilled men in all sectors. In contrast to the 
combined skill-weighted measure of the total gender-wage gap discussed above, the point-
estimates of the gap between unskilled men and women is the smallest in foreign-invested 
firms (5%) and the largest in state-owned enterprises (18%). 
Next, we calculate the wage-gap among men and women with more than 12 years of 
education. This is done by subtracting the coefficient which captures the education premium 
of women compared to unskilled males ( ) from the coefficient of the male education 
premium  ( ),  reported  in  rows  3  and  4  respectively.  For  all  ownership  sectors,  these   22 
relative wage- parameters exceed zero, meaning that that human capital investments of both 
women and men are reflected in higher wages.   
Market reform appears to have favored the wage growth of skilled men. The gender-
wage  gap between skilled men and women is not  statistically different form  zero among 
SOEs, and skilled women are found to earn more than skilled men (by 59%) in COEs. In 
contrast,  there  is  a  significantly  larger  wage  advantage  of  men  in  foreign-invested  firms 
(117%) and in firms with investments from HKMT (75%). These results indicate that skilled 
men have been able to take advantage of the internationalization of ownership in the industrial 
sector to larger extent than skilled women.  
Row 5 in Table 4 tests the hypotheses of equal wages and productivities of men and 
women by ownership sector. The results do not alter our conclusions from the overall firm 
sample. Women‟s productivities fall further behind men‟s productivities than their wages do. 
Put differently, women appear to receive wages that exceed their productivity in all the six 
ownership sectors under consideration. The largest disparity is found among collective owned 
enterprises and  the smallest  in  workplaces  funded by  foreign entities  or entities  in  Hong 
Kong, Macao, or Taiwan. Driving this  result are the smaller productivity lags  of women 
within the ownership sectors enjoying non-mainland investment. As such, the results suggest 
that female labor has been more efficiently allocated in the most internationalized sectors.  
Increasing  the  share  of  skilled  employees  of  both  genders  is  associated  with 
productivity gains for firms in all sectors. Rows 7 and 8 in Table 4 show the difference 
between  the  size  of  these  productivity  gains  for  the  firms,  and  the  size  of  the  education 
premiums received by the employees. Echoing the result from the overall sample, we see that 
wage premiums fall short of reflecting the productivity contributions in all ownership sectors.  
   23 
Table 4 
Joint production function and wage equation estimates: Cobb-Douglas production function, ownership-based sub-samples 
  SOE  COE  PRI  HKMT  FIE  Other 
Wages and productivities relative 



































































































































Wage-productivity gap for…                         
   ...female workers  0.31    0.43    0.37    0.22    0.12    0.36   
   …female unskilled workers  0.12    0.50    0.42    0.23    0.23    0.40   
   …female skilled workers  -0.44    -1.17    -0.73    -0.96    -1.86    -0.44   
   …male skilled workers  -3.11    -1.78    -1.49    -2.30    -2.75    -1.85   
Log capital  
0.20 
(.01)    0.20 
(.01)    0.21 
(.00)    0.70 
(.02)    0.22 
(.00)    0.22 
(.00)   
Log labor 
0.77 
(.02)    0.49 
(.02)    0.52 
(.01)    0.19 
(.00)    0.70 
(.02)    0.65 
(.01)   



















































R-squared  0.76  0.90  0.42  0.80  0.41  0.78  0.84  0.56  0.62  0.83  0.57  0.84 
Correlation between equations  0.22    0.13    0.09    0.12    0.13    0.13   
N  14,803    16,046    86,587    22,192    23,062    32,253   
Notes: All equations include a constant term and dummy variables for geographical location (22 provinces, 5 administrative regions and 4 municipalities, Beijing = reference), 
industry (38 categories, textile = reference), size (five categories, < 51 employees  =  reference), age (four categories, established earlier than 1994 = reference), unionization 
(1 if the firm has a union), the share of state capital in total capital, and the share of foreign and HKMT capital in total capital. Bold letters indicate that the null-hypothesis of 
equal wages and productivities for workers of gender i and skill-group j,    or  , is rejected at the five percent level. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis.     24 
5.3 Does non-wage compensation widen the gender-gap in earnings? 
We  now  examine  how  non-wage  compensation  is  distributed  among  male  and  female 
employees  in  the Chinese industrial sector. The sum  of the firm‟s  expenditures  on social 
insurances is added to the wage measure in equation (4) before joint estimation with  the 
production function (3). Results are placed in Table 3, columns (3) and (4). In particular, we 
are interested in comparing the parameters of the altered wage equation in column (4) to the 
benchmark salary-only estimates in column (1). This exercise shows that the distributions are 
highly similar. The earnings difference among unskilled workers remains unaffected, showing 
that non-wage benefits are not disproportionally allocated between men and women with less 
than 12 years of education.  
Non-wage compensation is distributed to the advantage of skilled workers. It raises 
the average earnings received by skilled women by 17% (1.82-1.65), and those of skilled men 
by 8% (2.01-1.93). This result could reflect the incentives of firms to retain skilled workers by 
providing them with social insurances which are not easily transferred from one workplace to 
another.  It  could  also  be the  consequence of a higher  demand  for tax exempt insurances 
among workers subjected to higher than average income tax levels. The result that skilled 
women are more likely than skilled men to be covered by social insurances means that the 
gender-gap in total earnings between skilled workers is narrower than the gap in wages. The 
male advantage in compensation is reduced from 29% to 19%. 
Summing  up  the  results  for  the  role  of  social  insurance  payments  in  gender-
distribution of earnings, we can conclude that such payments do not widen wage-disparities 
between unskilled men and women.  Among workers with more than 12 years of education, 
payments are skewed slightly in favor of women, causing the gender-wage gap to become 
somewhat narrower than when we consider wages alone. The result that social insurance 
contributions  are  largely  unimportant  to  the  gender-distribution  of  work  compensation  is   25 
robust to removing all firms that do not contribute to all the insurances considered
22 (Table 
B1). Findings for the six ownership sectors are also robust to the inclusion of non -wage 
compensation in the earnings measure, as evidenced by comparing Table 4 to Table B2.  
 
5.4 Robustness checks 
A  number  of  robustness  checks  carried  out  to  assess  the  sensitivity  of  the  main  results 
presented  above.  We  first  replace  the  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  with  a  translog 
version. Results placed in Table B3, Appendix B, show only slight alterations in the estimated 
earnings  and  productivity  differentials  in  the  full  sample.  Next,  we  consider  if  industrial 
segregation by gender is an important factor in gender-wage inequality, as suggested by some 
previous studies (Maurer-Fazio et al., 1999; Gustafsson and Li, 2000; Hughes and Maurer-
Fazio, 2002). If women are crowded into low-paying industries, the female-to-male wage 
differential  F   should rise if we remove the industrial dummies from the vector of control 
variables
23. Estimation results (not reported) however show no change in   the parameter, 
meaning that industrial segregation does not substantially contribute to the gender-wage gap. 
The use of cross-sectional data in this paper does not allow us to distinguish whether 
the lower productivity of females stem from their weaker performance within firms, or from a 
gender-productivity variation across firms. The latter could be the consequ ence of women 
being compelled to self-select into joining less productive enterprises. If women take jobs in 
firms that are more labor intensive, and labor has a decreasing return in the firm‟s production 
function, the share of women would be negatively correlated to firm productivity. We test this 
hypothesis by dividing the full sample according to the median capital-to-labor ratio. The 
estimation results do not provide support for the idea that women are sorted into more labor 
                                                 
22 this leaves 30,995 firms where total non-wage compensation make up on average 39% of the firms‟ total wage costs. 
23 The descriptive statistics in Table A3 indeed indicate substantial gender-segregation between industries. The share of 
female employees ranges from 12% in the 1,204 firms engaged in mining and processing of ferrous metal ores, to 70% in the 
9,416 firms that manufacture apparel, footwear and caps.   26 
intensive firms with lower labor productivity. The productivity differential between men and 
women (row one, Table B4) remains largely unchanged despite the sample division.   
 It has been argued that technological change that improves on firm productivity and 
conserves on labor leads to the dismissal of (generally male) production labor (Berman et al., 
1994; Dunne et al., 1997). Under such circumstances, the productivity of females would be 
overestimated in our analysis, due to the positive correlation between the share of women and 
the  productivity  enhancing  technological  change.  Table  B5  examines  this  hypothesis  by 
dividing  the  data  into  two  sub-samples  along  the  median  share  of  women  in  the  firm‟s 
workforce. Controlling for the share of females by splitting the sample in this way should 
yield  larger  gender  differences  in  productivity  if  the  hypothesis  is  true.  Comparing  the 
estimation results within the two sub-samples to the baseline in Table 3 shows that the skill-
weighted average gender-difference in productivity remains constant.  
If female employees work fewer hours than males, measuring labor input by the 
average number of female and male workers per  year can lead to  a negative bias in  the 
estimated productivity of women. Using individual-level data, we can calculate labor input 
weights and attempt to correct this potential bias. The widely used China Household Income 
Project (CHIP) data for year 2002 includes information on the yearly, monthly and weekly 
work hours for employed men and women with different educational levels working for firms 
under different ownership. Average work-years for skilled and unskilled men and women are 
calculated by multiplying the usual number of hours worked in a week with the number of 
weeks worked in a month and the number of months worked in a year. Weights are calculated 
by normalizing the work-year measure for each group with respect to unskilled male workers.  
The calculated labor input weights, presented in Table B6, are consistent with the 
expected gender and skill patterns. Employees with higher education work fewer hours per 
week than those with lower education. Female unskilled employees supply less labor than   27 
their male unskilled colleagues in SOEs, but more in foreign-invested firms. Unambiguous 
ownership information in the CHIP data is not available for HKMT invested firms, or firms 
with the mixed ownership structures included in the category “Other” in this paper. Table B7 
contains the estimation results with and without labor input weights after the exclusion of 
these  two  ownership  sectors.  The  general  conclusions  of  the  paper  concerning  the 
productivity disadvantage of women remain unchanged. We however note that for skilled 
women  and  men,  taking  account  of  their  on  average  shorter  work-weeks  compared  to 
unskilled  workers  decreases  the  estimated  under-payment  of  these  groups  by  about  10 
percentage points.  
Labor  unions  are  the  bylaw  designated  monitors  of  firm  compliance  with  anti-
discriminatory  laws  and  regulations  and  may  therefore  provide  gender-specific  wage 
protection (Cooke, 2001). Empirical research has provided evidence of more narrow gender-
earnings  gaps  in  unionized  organizations  (i.e.  Elvira  and  Saporta,  2001),  and  Ge  (2007) 
showed that Chinese firms with established unions had higher levels of wages, non-wage 
benefits, and productivity. We examine the effect of unionization by estimating our wage- and 
production function in the sub-sample of 92,174 firms with unions, and that of 102,768 firms 
without unions, separately. The results in Table B8 show no effect of unionization on the 
average  male-female  wage  or  productivity  gaps.  For  unskilled  women,  their  productivity 
disadvantage is however slightly smaller (38% compared to 50%) in the unionized firms.  
Dong and Zhang (2009) find that women are paid in excess of their productivity in 
the state-owned sector, but not in the private sector. They argue that the legacy from the 
planned economy is important to understanding this result: while the state assigned women to 
positions  within  heavy  industry  for  which  they  were  physically  disadvantages,  they  were 
rewarded the same wages as men (Korzec, 1992). Results found in this paper do not provide 
support to Dong and Zhang‟s claim in the sense that the over-payment of women should be   28 
restricted to the state-sector. In fact, the magnitude of the productivity disadvantage of women 
in SOEs is not statistically different from that in collective, private or HKMT-funded firms 
(see Table 4). However, the ownership-segregated results may be misinterpreted if privatized 
firms  retain  the  legacy  of  mis-matched  productivities  and  wages.  Running  the  empirical 
analysis on a sub-sample of firms established more than 20 years ago (17,573 observations) 
however does not change the size of the gender-gap in productivity.   
Regardless of the role of state planners in assigning women to specific jobs, female 
workers may still be “biologically” less productive than men in industries where a larger share 
of the jobs requires physical strength. Dividing the full sample into 14 aggregated industrial 
sectors
24 provides some support to this more general claim. Examining Table B9 we find that 
women‟s productivity disadvantages are larger than average in heavy industries such as the 
Power (75%), Petroleum (76%), and Chemical (57%) sectors.  
China‟s special economic zones were set up to attract foreign investment and are the 
geographical locations where market reform has advanced the furthest. Table B10 contains 
the  estimation  results  for  a  sample  of  13,041  firms  located  in  the  six SEZs:  Zhuhai  and 
Shantou in Guangdong Province, Xiamen in Fujian Province, the entire province of Hainan, 
and Pudong New Area in the city of Shanghai. We first note that the estimated wage-gap 
between unskilled men and women drops from 11% in the full sample to 0%, while the wage 
gap among skilled workers remains constant. Examining the industry-specific wage-gaps in 
Table B9, we note that this result could stem from small gender-wage gaps among unskilled 
workers in light industrial sectors such as Tailoring (0%), Leather products (0%), and Textiles 
(6%). Recalling that these sectors are those with the largest shares of female workers, the 
conclusion  is  that  market  reform  appears  to  have  improved  the  prospects  of  gainful 
employment and the relative incomes of unskilled women
25.  
                                                 
24 in accordance with the ex-factory price index categories used in China‟s official statistical publications.   
25 A note of caution when interpreting the positive effects on women‟s lives from the new employment opportunities is   29 
From  Table  B10  also  see  that  the  productivity  gap  between  unskilled  men  and 
women  is  not  significantly  different  from  zero  in  the  Special  Economic  Zones.  As  a 
consequence, the hypothesis of equal wages and productivities for unskilled women cannot be 
rejected.  One  interpretation  of  this  result  is  that  firms  in  the  Zones  operate  on  more 
competitive product and labor markets, which pushes firms to organize labor more efficiently. 
Another interpretation is that expanded work opportunities in the light industrial sectors that 
dominate the SEZs have improved women‟s relative productivity.  
 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
Properly identifying the existence and extent of discrimination in work compensation is of 
great economic importance. Discriminated worker-groups are discouraged from participating 
in employment and from investing in skill development and education. As a consequence, 
human  capital  is  underdeveloped  and  under-utilized,  and  long-term  growth  is  negatively 
affected. This paper has used firm-level data for Chinese industrial enterprises to investigate if 
women face discriminatory behavior in the hands of employers.  
The estimated gender-wage gap of 11% is narrower than those found for other large 
economies  by  researchers  using  firm-level  data  and  similar  methodologies.  This  result 
suggests that the Maoist ideology of gender equality has carried over in the market transition. 
Contradicting this hypothesis is the result that the narrowest gaps exist in the most liberalized 
sectors. Among firms that are located Special Economic Zones, and in certain light industrial 
sectors, women and men are estimated to earn on average equal wages. In light of these 
results, market reforms do not appear to have triggered greater wage inequality between men 
and women. Rather, the results suggest that a shift from heavy to light industry, combined 
                                                                                                                                                          
however merited by the numerous studies arguing that these opportunities consist largely of precarious jobs with inferior job 
security (Razavi, 2007; Cooke, 2005), and under exploitative working conditions (Burda, 2007; Pun, 2007; Berik et al., 2007).     30 
with labor market reforms, may have improved women‟s access to gainful employment. In 
line with this observation is the result that equal wages are observed in the industrial sectors 
with the highest shares of women, namely in Tailoring firms, and in firms producing Textile 
or Leather products. If women would be crowded into these sectors, then, in accordance with 
Bergmann‟s (1974) crowding-in model, we would expect relative wages to fall. In contrast, 
their expansion in the transition period appears to have improved women‟s relative incomes. 
I  find  no  empirical  evidence  of  earnings  discrimination  against  female  industrial 
workers. On the contrary, the results suggest that women‟s wages exceed their contributions 
to firm productivity. However, a lower average productivity among female industrial workers 
could imply that female labor is less efficiently allocated than male labor. Comparing the size 
of the productivity disadvantage of women across the numerous sub-samples used in this 
paper shows that foreign-invested firms, and firms with HKMT-investments, have been more 
successful in harnessing women‟s productivity. Smaller productivity disadvantages of women 
are  also  found  for  firm  located  in  China‟s  Special  Economic  Zones.  Female  labor  hence 
appears to have been more efficiently allocated in sectors that operate on product and labor 
markets where the competitive pressure is higher.  
The results show a narrower gender-wage gap among workers with less than 12 years 
of education than among workers with higher educational attainments. A main contributor to 
this observation is that skilled men appear to have benefitted from the internationalization of 
industrial ownership to a greater extent than women.  
Implementation of China‟s reformed social insurance system has been slow, and 
researchers have suggested the existence of a gender-bias in the distribution of the non-salary 
provisions. The findings in this paper do not support this conjecture. Estimation of a total 
earnings equation where each firm‟s expenditures on non-wage compensation are added to its 
total wage bill does not alter the estimated degree of overall gender polarization in earnings.   31 
The under-representation of women in the generous State-owned firms hence appears to be 
balanced  out  by  their  over-representation  in  foreign-invested  enterprises  that  are  highly 
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Appendix A: Additional descriptive statistics 
 
Table A1  
Components of Chinese urban earnings statistics 
The statistical concept of wage (gongzi) or earnings for on-post urban “staff and workers” includes the 
following components, whether the employees receive the earnings or benefits in money or in kind and whether 
the earnings or benefits are or are not taxable items: 
Monthly or annual salary income (including base   Transport subsidy (car or shuttle bus provided, cash  
   earnings and additions based on position, seniority,      for bus or taxi, and so on) 
   wage scale, and so on)  Housing subsidy (dormitory provided, or directly 
Earnings during on-the-job training, probationary      Subsidized rent or purchase of housing) 
    period  Individual income tax deducted from earnings and 
Employee income paid on an irregular basis      paid directly by enterprise to government 
Hourly payment for work performed  Social insurance funds (pension, medical,  
Piecework payment for work performed      unemployment insurance funds, and housing  
Bonus payments      purchase fund) deducted from the employee's  
Incentive, performance-based payments      wage and paid by the work unit to government  
Overtime pay      on behalf of the employee 
Hardship, danger pay  Money for rent, and utilities (electricity, water) 
All kinds of subsidies in cash or in kind  Money given for fixed line or mobile phone 
Festival, holiday subsidy  Clothing subsidy 
Travel money, food allowance while traveling  Subsidy compensating workers for lack of vacation 
Transport subsidy (car or shuttle bus provided, cash      time 
    for bus or taxi, and so on)  Earnings during approved leaves of absence, pay for      
Personal services such as baths, haircuts      time not worked (regular vacation, compassionate  
Books, newspapers, magazines provided for      leave, to visit relatives, family-planning operation,  
    employees      national or societal duty, study leave, leave due to  
Meals provided, food allowance      sickness or injury) 
Earnings during on-the-job training, probationary  Anything that has the nature or spirit of labor  
    period      earnings, even if it is not spelled out in the  
Earnings during on-the-job training, probationary       regulations 
    period   
Source: Laodong gongzi; tongji taizhang [Labor wages; statistical accounts] (Beijing, Beijing Municipality 
Statistical Bureau, 2004), pp. 2–1 to 2–5, cited in Banister (2005)   36 
Table A2  
Aggregation of registration-based classification of firms into ownership categories 
Registration-based classification  
(since 1998) 
Categories under which data on all industrial 
enterprises are reported in the Statistical 
Yearbook 
Domestic enterprises    
SOEs  State 
COEs  Collective 
Employee shareholding company  Collective 
Joint operation enterprises    
State-owned  State (1) 
Collective owned  Other  
State- and collective owned  Other (2)  
Other joint operation enterprises  Other (2)  
Limited liability companies    
Solely state-owned  State 
Others  State or Other (3)  
Stock companies  State or Other (3)  
Private enterprises    
Private sole proprietorships  Private 
Private partnerships  Private 
Private limited liability company  Private 
Private stock companies  Private 
Other enterprises   Other 
HKMT-invested enterprises    
Joint equity ventures (JVEs)  HKMT or State (2)  
Contractual joint ventures (CJVs)  HKMT or State (2)  
Wholly HKMT-owned  HKMT 
HKMT stock companies  HKMT or State (2)  
Foreign-invested enterprises    
Chinese-foreign JEVs  Foreign or State (2) 
Chinese-foreign CJVs  Foreign or State (2) 
Wholly foreign-owned  Foreign 
Foreign-invested stock company  Foreign or State (2) 
Notes: The table details the ownership aggregation of registration-based firm classification system into 
six  broader  categories  when  reporting  data  on  all  industrial  firms  in  the  China  Statistical  Yearbook. 
Departures from the CSY aggregation method are reported in footnotes (1)-(3) below.  Information about 
the CSY aggregation methodology is contained in Holz and Lin (2001).  
(1)  Unlike in the Statistical Yearbook, this category is not double-counted as “Other”.   
(2)  When ownership-disaggregated statistics are reported per ownership in the Statistical Yearbook, 
a  proportion  of  the  statistic  is  double-counted  in  the  “State”  category.  This  proportion 
corresponds to the aggregate share of the sum of state capital to the sum of total paid-in capital 
minus  individual  capital  in  the  registration-based  classification  category.  I  instead  count  an 
individual firm as State-owned if the state‟s share in total capital is greater than 50%.    
(3)  This category is counted as “State” in the Statistical Yearbook for firms that are under absolute 
state control (guoyou juedui konggu) or relative state control (guoyou xiahgdui konggu). The 
first implies that the state account for more than 50% of total capital. The second that the state 
holds less than 50% of total capital but that i) its share is relatively large compared to the shares 
of other ownership categories, or ii) even though one or more other ownership categories have a 
larger capital share, the state in effect holds the control right s by agreement (Xiyi kongzhi). In 
this paper, only absolute state-controlled firms may be identified, and these are moved from the 
“Other” to the “State” category.    37 
Table A3 
Number of firms and share of female employees by 2-digit industrial sector  






Manufacturing Industry     
Mfg. of Apparel, Footwear and Caps  9,416  0.70 
Mfg. of Articles for Culture, Education and Sports   2,754  0.58 
Mfg. of Artwork and Other Manufacturing  272  0.27 
Mfg. of Beverages  2,265  0.42 
Mfg. of Chemical Fiber  1,040  0.46 
Mfg. of Comm. Equip., Computers, and Electronic Equipment  2,884  0.44 
Mfg. of Electrical Machinery and Equipment  7,136  0.53 
Mfg. of Foods  3,809  0.49 
Mfg. of Furniture  2,236  0.33 
Mfg. of General Purpose Machinery  14,772  0.28 
Mfg. of Articles for culture, education and Sports   3,920  0.57 
Mfg. of Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products  4,846  0.59 
Mfg. of Medicines  3,316  0.46 
Mfg. of Metal Products  10,552  0.33 
Mfg. of Non-metallic Mineral Products  14,064  0.29 
Mfg. of Paper and Paper Products  5,443  0.39 
Mfg. of Plastics  9,198  0.45 
Mfg. of Rubber  2,254  0.44 
Mfg. of Special Purpose Machinery  7,245  0.27 
Mfg. of Tobacco  140  0.40 
Mfg. of Transport Equipment  8,569  0.31 
Mfg. of Weapons and Ammunition  11,898  0.43 
Mfg. of raw Chemical Mat'ls and Chem. Products   13,718  0.30 
Textile Industry  17,484  0.64 
Mining and Utilities     
Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas  142  0.19 
Mining and Processing of Ferrous Metal Ores  1,204  0.12 
Mining and Processing of Non-Ferrous Metal Ores  950  0.17 
Mining and Processing of Non-metal Ores  1,500  0.17 
Mining and Washing of Coal  3,406  0.10 
Mining and Processing of Other Ores  10  0.15 
Printing, Reproduction and Recording Media  3,772  0.45 
Food Processing  9,384  0.38 
Processing of Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel  1,357  0.24 
Processing of Timber, Mfg. of Wood, etc. Products  3,618  0.43 
Production and Distrib. of Water  2,183  0.40 
Production and Distrib. of Electric Power and Heat Power  4,348  0.28 
Production and Distrib. of Gas  369  0.32 
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals  4,722  0.19 
Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals  3,644  0.25 
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Table A4 
Number of firms and share of female employees by geographical region  
Province, Municipality 






Municipalities     
    Beijing  4,619  0.35 
    Chongqing  2,089  0.35 
    Shanghai  12,870  0.42 
    Tianjin  3,931  0.37 
Autonomous Regions     
    Guanxi   2,558  0.37 
    Inner Mongolia   1,824  0.31 
    Ningxia   432  0.32 
    Xinjiang   989  0.33 
    Tibet   136  0.26 
Provinces     
    Anhui  3,812  0.39 
    Fujian  10,091  0.46 
    Gansu  1,121  0.30 
    Guangdong  28,419  0.44 
    Guizhou  1,533  0.29 
    Hainan  431  0.37 
    Hebei  7,11  0.33 
    Heilongjiang  1,901  0.34 
    Henan  114  0.36 
    Hubei  4,461  0.38 
    Hunan  6,001  0.33 
    Jiangsu  28,842  0.45 
    Jiangxi  2,872  0.41 
    Jilin  1,92  0.33 
    Liaoning  7,681  0.34 
    Qinghai  256  0.29 
    Shaanxi  2,042  0.32 
    Shandong  18,957  0.40 
    Shanxi  3,043  0.20 
    Sishuan  5,577  0.31 
    Yunnan  1,644  0.31 
    Zhejiang  32,564  0.43 
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Appendix B: Robustness checks 
 
Table B1 
Joint production function and earnings equation estimates: Cobb-Douglas production 
function, firms with non-zero expenditures on all three non-wage compensation items 
Wages, total compensation, and 
productivities relative to 
unskilled male workers for… 
Log 
(Value 












(4)   




































Wage-productivity gap for…         
   ...female workers  0.26    0.28   
   …female unskilled workers  0.15    0.17   
   …female skilled workers  -0.50    -0.42   










  0.71 
(.05) 
 



















R-squared  0.66  0.87  0.86  0.67 
Correlation between equations  0.15    0.15   
N  30,995    30,995   
Notes:  All  equations  include  a  constant  term  and  dummy  variables  for  geographical 
location (22 provinces, 5 administrative regions and 4 municipalities, Beijing = reference), 
industry  (38  categories,  textile  =  reference),  size  (five  categories,  <  51  employees    =  
reference), age (four categories, established earlier than 1994 = reference), unionization (1 
if the firm has a union), ownership (six categories, private Chinese firms = reference), the 
share of state capital in total capital, and the share of foreign and HKMT capital in total 
capital. Bold letters indicate that the null-hypothesis of equal wages and productivities for 
workers of gender i and skill-group j,    or  , is rejected at the 
five percent level. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   
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Table B2 
Joint production function and total compensation equation estimates: Cobb-Douglas production function, ownership-based sub-samples 
  SOE  COE  PRI  HKMT  FIE  Other 
Total compensation and 
productivities relative to 
unskilled male workers for… 
Log 
(Value 






































































































































Wage-productivity gap for…                         
   ...female workers  0.23    0.47    0.36    0.22    0.12    0.37   
   …female unskilled workers  0.12    0.51    0.41    0.23    0.24    0.39   
   …female skilled workers  -0.29    -0.49    -0.61    -0.85    -1.64    -0.44   




  0.20 
(.01)   
0.21 
(.00)   
0.19 
(.00) 
  0.21 
(.00) 
  0.22 




  0.50 
(.02)   
0.53 
(.01)   
0.71 
(.02) 
  0.71 
(.04) 
  0.65 
(.01)   



















































R-squared   0.76  0.89  0.42  0.78  0.41  0.76  0.56  0.83  0.90  0.53  0.57  0.83 
Correlation between equations      0.13    0.10    0.12    0.13    0.13   
N  14,805    16,046    86,591    22,192    20,063    32,253   
Notes: All equations include a constant term and dummy variables for geographical location (22 provinces, 5 administrative regions and 4 municipalities, Beijing = reference), 
industry (38 categories, textile = reference), size (five categories, < 51 employees  =  reference), age (four categories, established earlier than 1994 = reference), unionization 
(1 if the firm has a union), the share of state capital in total capital, and the share of foreign and HKMT capital in total capital. Bold letters indicate that the null-hypothesis of 
equal wages and productivities for workers of gender i and skill-group j,    or  , is rejected at the five percent level. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis.     41 
Table B3 
Joint production function and earnings equation estimates:  
Translog production function, all firms 
Wages, total compensation, and 
productivities relative to unskilled 







































   …male skilled workers         
Wage-productivity gap for…  0.30    0.31   
   ...female workers  0.36    0.35   
   …female unskilled workers  -0.91    -0.73   
   …female skilled workers  -2.04    -1.93   
   ...female workers 
0.39 
(.02)   
0.40 
(.02)   
   …female unskilled workers 
-0.17 
(.01)   
-0.17 
(.01)   
   …female skilled workers 
-0.02 
(.00)   
-0.02 
(.00)   
   …male skilled workers 
0.04 
(.00)   
0.04 
(.00)   
Wage-productivity gap for… 
0.03 
(.00)   
0.03 
(.00)   


















   …female skilled workers  0.57  0.84  0.57  0.83 
   …male skilled workers  0.12    0.13   
N  194,942    194,950   
Notes: All equations include a constant term and dummy variables for geographical location 
(22 provinces, 5 administrative regions and 4 municipalities, Beijing = reference), industry (38 
categories, textile = reference), size (five categories, < 51 employees  =  reference), age (four 
categories, established earlier than 1994 = reference), unionization (1 if the firm has a union), 
ownership (six categories, private Chinese firms = reference), the share of state capital in total 
capital, and the share of foreign and HKMT capital in total capital. Bold letters indicate that the 
null-hypothesis of equal wages and productivities for workers of gender i and skill-group j,  
 or  ,  is  rejected  at  the  five  percent  level.  Standard  errors  are 
reported in parenthesis.     42 
Table B4 
Joint production function and earnings equation estimates: Cobb-Douglas  
production function, firm sub-samples based on the median capital-to-labor ratio 
 
High capital-to-labor ratio, 
above or equal to median 
(1.76) 
Low capital-to-labor ratio, 
below median (1.76) 
 
Wages and productivities relative to 













































Wage-productivity gap for…         
   ...female workers  0.33    0.29   
   …female unskilled workers  0.38    0.32   
   …female skilled workers  -0.70    -0.90   
   …male skilled workers  -1.98    -1.74   
Log capital 
0.28 
(.00)   
0.16 
(.00)   
Log labor 
0.53 
(.01)   
0.73 
(.01)   


















R-squared  0.52  0.79  0.60  0.86 
Correlation between equations  0.13    0.12   
N  97,122    97,820   
Notes:  All  equations  include  a  constant  term  and  dummy  variables  for  geographical  location  (22 
provinces, 5 administrative regions and 4 municipalities, Beijing = reference), industry (38 categories, 
textile  =  reference),  size  (five  categories,  <  51  employees    =    reference),  age  (four  categories, 
established earlier than 1994 = reference), unionization (1 if the firm has a union), ownership (six 
categories, private Chinese firms = reference), the share of state capital in total capital, and the share 
of foreign and HKMT capital in total capital. Bold letters indicate that the null-hypothesis of equal 
wages and productivities for workers of gender i and skill-group j,    or  , 
is rejected at the five percent level. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   
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Table B5 
Joint production function and earnings equation estimates: Cobb-Douglas production 
function, firm sub-samples based on the median share of female employees  
 
High share of females, 
above median (0.37) 
 
Low share of females, 
below or equal to median 
(0.37) 
Wages and productivities relative to 













































Wage-productivity gap for…         
   ...female workers  0.25    0.45   
   …female unskilled workers  0.26    0.47   
   …female skilled workers  -1.11    -0.27   
   …male skilled workers  -2.66    -1.73   
Log capital 
0.20 
(.00)   
0.23 
(.00)   
Log labor 
0.63 
(.01)   
0.62 
(.01)   


















R-squared  0.54  0.84  0.57  0.84 
Correlation between equations  0.12    0.14   
N  97,598    97,344   
Notes:  All  equations  include  a  constant  term  and  dummy  variables  for  geographical  location  (22 
provinces, 5 administrative regions and 4 municipalities, Beijing = reference), industry (38 categories, 
textile  =  reference),  size  (five  categories,  <  51  employees    =    reference),  age  (four  categories, 
established earlier than 1994 = reference), unionization (1 if the firm has a union), ownership (six 
categories, private Chinese firms = reference), the share of state capital in total capital, and the share 
of foreign and HKMT capital in total capital. Bold letters indicate that the null-hypothesis of equal 
wages and productivities for workers of gender i and skill-group j,    or  , 
is rejected at the five percent level. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   
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Table B6  















           
SOE  Unskilled males  1.000  PRI  Unskilled males  1.000 
  Unskilled females  0.959    Unskilled females  0.955 
  Skilled males  0.992    Skilled males  0.918 
  Skilled females   0.945    Skilled females   0.738 
           
COE  Unskilled males  1.000  FIE  Unskilled males  1.000 
  Unskilled females  0.951    Unskilled females  1.103 
  Skilled males  0.999    Skilled males  0.945 
  Skilled females   0.861    Skilled females   0.964 
   
Table B7 
Joint production function and earnings equation estimates:  
Cobb-Douglas production function, gender-skill weighted labor inputs 
  No weights  Weights 
Wages and productivities relative 













































Wage-productivity gap for…         
   ...female workers  0.33    0.33   
   …female unskilled workers  0.35    0.34   
   …female skilled workers  -0.61    -0.44   
   …male skilled workers  -1.81    -1.70   
Log capital 
0.21 
(.00)   
0.21 
(.00)   
Log labor 
0.60 
(.01)   
0.60 
(.01)   



















R-squared   0.94  0.49  0.94  0.51 
Correlation between equations  0.12    0.13   
Notes:  N  =  139,634.  All  equations  include  a  constant  term  and  dummy  variables  for 
geographical location (22 provinces, 5 administrative regions and 4 municipalities, Beijing = 
reference), industry (38 categories, textile = reference), size (five categories, < 51 employees  
=  reference), age (four categories, established earlier than 1994 = reference), unionization (1 
if the firm has a union), ownership (six categories, private Chinese firms = reference), the 
share of state capital in total capital, and the share of foreign and HKMT capital in total 
capital. Bold letters indicate that the null-hypothesis of equal wages and productivities for 
workers of gender i and skill-group j,    or  , is rejected at the 
five percent level. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   
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Table B8 
Joint production function and earnings equation estimates  
Cobb-Douglas production function, firms with and without labor union 
  Union  No union 
Wages and productivities relative 













































Wage-productivity gap for…         
   ...female workers  0.28    0.32   
   …female unskilled workers  0.28    0.40   
   …female skilled workers  -0.73    -0.93   
   …male skilled workers  -2.39    -1.72   
Log capital 
0.24 
(.00)   
0.20 
(.00)   
Log labor 
0.69 
(.01)   
0.55 
(.01)   



















R-squared   0.62  0.86  0.46  0.80 
Correlation between equations  0.14    0.11   
N  92,174    102,768   
Notes: All equations include a constant term and dummy variables for geographical location 
(22 provinces, 5 administrative regions and 4 municipalities, Beijing = reference), industry 
(38 categories, textile = reference), size (five categories, < 51 employees  =  reference), age 
(four categories, established earlier than 1994 = reference), unionization (1 if the firm has a 
union),  ownership  (six  categories,  private  Chinese  firms  =  reference),  the  share  of  state 
capital in total capital, and the share of foreign and HKMT capital in total capital. Bold letters 
indicate that the null-hypothesis of equal wages and productivities for workers of gender i 
and  skill-group  j,     or  ,  is  rejected  at  the  five  percent  level. 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.     46 
Table B9 
Joint production function and earnings equation estimates: Industrial categories 























Added)   
Log 
(Wages) 








































































for…  0.41    0.48    -1.55    0.65   
...female workers  0.52    0.39    -0.91    0.57   
 …female 
unskilled workers  -0.51    0.86    -13.91    1.21   
…female skilled 
workers  -0.91    -2.73    -3.16    -0.32   
R-squared   0.12    0.16    0.17    0.17   
N  22,028    6,283    2,859    1,768   
 


























Added)   
Log 
(Wages) 








































































for…  0.17    0.35    0.08    0.45   
...female workers  0.24    0.33    0.18    0.49   
 …female 
unskilled workers  -1.27    -0.20    -1.42    -0.02   
…female skilled 
workers  -1.91    -1.97    -1.62    -1.42   
R-Squared  0.12    0.14    0.13    0.12   
N  51,565    13,658    5,728    28,869   
Notes: All equations include a constant term and dummy variables for geographical location (22 provinces, 5 
administrative  regions  and  4  municipalities,  Beijing  =  reference),  size  (five  categories,  <  51  employees    =  
reference), age (four categories, established earlier than 1994 = reference), unionization (1 if the firm has a 
union), ownership (six categories, private Chinese firms = reference), the share of state capital in total capital, 
and the share of foreign and HKMT capital in total capital. Bold letters indicate that the null-hypothesis of equal 
wages and productivities for workers of gender i and skill-group j,    or  , is rejected 
at the five percent level. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.     47 
Table B9 contd. 
Joint production function and earnings equation estimates: Industrial categories 
  Food  Textile  Tailoring 
Wages and productivities relative 




































































Wage-productivity gap for…             
   ...female workers  0.53    -0.12    0.25   
   …female unskilled workers  0.54    0.44    0.19   
   …female skilled workers  0.61    -1.12    -1.80   
   …male skilled workers  -1.33    -1.65    -3.35   
R-squared   0.16    0.08    0.10   
N  15,095    17,328    9,323   
 
Paper  Culture and 
Education  Leather 
Wages and productivities relative 




































































Wage-productivity gap for…             
   ...female workers  0.23    0.11    0.41   
   …female unskilled workers  0.28    0.23    0.38   
   …female skilled workers  -0.64    -2.02    -0.94   
   …male skilled workers  -1.06    -0.82    -3.43   
R-Squared  0.12    0.10    0.11   
N  9,062    6,588    4,788   
Notes: All equations include a constant term and dummy variables for geographical location (22 provinces, 5 
administrative  regions  and  4  municipalities,  Beijing  =  reference),  size  (five  categories,  <  51  employees    =  
reference), age (four categories, established earlier than 1994 = reference), unionization (1 if the firm has a 
union), ownership (six categories, private Chinese firms = reference), the share of state capital in total capital, 
and the share of foreign and HKMT capital in total capital. Bold letters indicate that the null-hypothesis of equal 
wages and productivities for workers of gender i and skill-group j,    or  , is rejected 
at the five percent level. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.     48 
 
Table B10 
Joint production function and earnings equation estimates: 
firms located in China’s Special Economic Zones 
Wages and productivities relative 
to unskilled male workers for… 
Log (Value 
Added)   
Log 
(Wages) 




















Wage-productivity gap for…     
   ...female workers  0.18   
   …female unskilled workers  0.03   
   …female skilled workers  -1.46   
   …male skilled workers  -4.00   
Log capital 
0.20 
(.01)   
Log labor 
0.73 
(.02)   










R-squared  0.61  0.85 
Correlation between equations  0.15   
Notes: N=10,230. All equations include a constant term and dummy 
variables for geographical location (22 provinces, 5 administrative 
regions  and  4  municipalities,  Beijing  =  reference),  industry  (38 
categories, textile = reference), size (five categories, < 51 employees  
=  reference), age (four categories, established earlier than 1994 = 
reference), unionization (1 if the firm has a union), ownership (six 
categories,  private  Chinese  firms  =  reference),  the  share  of  state 
capital in total capital, and the share of foreign and HKMT capital in 
total capital. Bold letters indicate that the null-hypothesis of equal 
wages and productivities for workers of gender i and skill-group j,  
 or  ,  is  rejected  at  the  five  percent 
level. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   
 